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□ comptes rendus 
Louis LAVFI.I.K, L'existence et la valeur, leçon 
inaugurale et résumés des cours au Collège de 
France (1941-1951). Paris, Documents et Inédits 
du Collège de France, 1991, 149 pages. 
December 2, 1941, the occasion of Louis Lavelle's 
inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, must have 
been one of the darkest days in the history of his 
country. A year and a half after the fall of France in 
a cheerless Paris winter marked by shortages of fuel 
and food, the first glimmers of hope had yet to appear. 
Lavelle set out to remind his audience of the main 
lines of French philosophy since Descartes. He paid 
tribute to his immediate predecessors, Edouard Le 
Roy and Henri Bergson, as men who represented the 
essentials of that tradition. But he singled out Nicolas 
Malebranche as "perhaps our greatest philosopher". 
Malebranche had "less glory" than Descartes, said 
Lavelle, but he deserved the place of honour because 
"his whole thought is an uninterrupted traffic 
between the self and God". 
To justify this judgement he offered his own pers-
pective on the history of philosophy and offered his 
own special theory about what is perennially true in 
it. Since the time of Bishop Agostino Steuco, the 
Vatican librarian whose Perenni Philosophia, pub-
lished in 1540, seems to have originated the term 
"perennial philosophy", it was essentially sound doc-
trine which was thought to make a philosophy per-
ennial. Modern Thomists emphasised the 
development of Aristotelianism rather than Steuco's 
Platonism, but they continued to emphasise the con-
tinuity of doctrine. 
Lavelle insists that the way in which philosophical 
systems are related to one another demands a diffe-
rent thesis. He begins by noticing that all philosophy 
has as its object the whole of being. Philosophies — 
or at any rate what Lavelle thought of as serious 
philosophies — do not differ from one another in 
scope. For they are all in some way about everything. 
And their details are relatively insignificant. Thus 
philosophy does not progress like the sciences in 
which new discoveries extend the scope of the subject 
and add more facts. Nor is there an historicist answer. 
Lavelle insists that "If one neglects what attaches to 
their epoch, that is to say their language, mores and 
the state of their knowledge, and if one searches for 
the indivisible centre of their thought, and their dee-
pest intention, Plato, St. Thomas and Descartes are 
our contemporaries." 
Yet philosophers do differ. They differ, Lavelle 
says, in their "profondeur", by which he means both 
their depth and their profundity. How are we to mea-
sure this? The greater part of his lectures at the 
Collège de France, lectures whose bare outlines are 
included in this book, were to be devoted to the 
examination of the history of philosophy in an effort 
to answer to this question. But the main clues are to 
be found in the inaugural lecture itself. 
Profundity has to do with the ways in which the 
human being can grasp being itself. Descartes' chief 
"glory", Lavelle says, was his realization that the 
principle of certainty is to be found in the grasping 
of the self by itself. But Malebranche, in associating 
this insight with the knowledge of God, discovered 
the source of its generality and the basis of its true 
insight into being. Others, Maine de Biran, Ravais-
son, Lachelier and Bergson — but especially Lache-
lier — sharpened the notion of spiritual activity 
which makes reality intelligible. And, indeed, 
Edouard Le Roy underlined the link between Des-
cartes and Malebranche in insisting that "the problem 
of God is the problem of the human spirit" and in 
insisting that God appears in our experience as the 
source of our unease. 
This unease is a personal thing and, therefore, 
though these philosophers offer us help and direction, 
philosophy, for Lavelle, is basically a personal medi-
tation. The argument — partly stated clearly and 
partly only implied here — is that, if philosophy is 
what sees reality whole, as being, then its search is 
the search for the unity in things. This unity cannot 
come from the plurality of things in themselves, but 
must come from thought. Lavelle suggests (though 
he does not mention Aristotle here) that what ulti-
mately unifies is thought, and that, to see the unity, 
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we must, like Aristotle's God, think about thinking. 
Philosophy is, therefore, always what is "present and 
personal". 
In these terms we can see how philosophies differ 
in "profondeur". For one can see thought in its most 
immediate form and one can see it in its most uni-
versal form. Finally one might see, like Malebranche, 
how the two must be conjoined. 
Lavelle remained faithful to his project. As the 
war drew to its close in 1944-45 (a year when there 
was shooting in the streets of Paris, some close to 
the Collège, as the little memorial plaques testify), 
Lavelle was deeply engaged in expounding the Pla-
tonic notions of part icipation, exploring how all 
things might be linked to the forms — but he was 
interested even more than Plato was in the ways in 
which this linkage could be manifested in human 
consciousness. The next year in the first of the two 
lectures he gave each week, he tried to press this 
linkage even further and the sub-title "l'émotion 
d'exister" appears in the prospectus for his Tuesday 
lectures. The second lecture each week returned to 
Descartes. 
In 1946-47, having laid his foundation with exten-
sive earlier lectures on Plato and Descartes, Lavelle 
tackled Malebranche directly. What interested him 
most was the way in which Malebranche transformed 
Descartes' innate ideas into something which is lite-
rally the activity of God. The next year he followed 
these notions with a further analysis of "the world 
of ideas", this time exploring the relations between 
the developing strands of Platonism and the notion 
of value — an issue about which Malebranche has 
much to say but which remains puzzling. But, again, 
the second series of lectures featured Descartes, 
though Leibniz was added this time. In 1948-49, not 
surprisingly, Descartes and Leibniz were displaced 
by Spinoza. In 1949-50 Lavelle addressed the diffe-
rent kinds of value in one series of lectures. But the 
itch to explore Platonism and neo-Platonism took him 
back to Plotinus in the second series. Interestingly, 
Aristotle took over the second series in the final year, 
1950-51 and, of course, the lectures had much to do 
with the intellect, the problem of the way in which 
form appears in nature, and the ultimate questions of 
individuation. 
These resumes, brief though they are, give us a 
new insight into Lavelle's mind and into the way in 
which he saw himself within the history of philoso-
phy. Together with the inaugural lecture, they pro-
vide, in fact, an argument for a very distinct kind of 
idealism. It takes its shape from the notion of thought 
as what unifies and of what thought stands against as 
essentially — as he says in the resumes of the last 
lectures — something negative. As such this idealism 
provides a ground for the reflective method in phi-
losophy and makes a case for an understanding of 
philosophy as something within which there can, 
indeed, be progress, but which, nonetheless, is per-
sonal in the sense that it always requires the active 
participation of the knowing subject. 
Lavelle has noi been at the forefront of recent 
philosophical thought though the mention of his name 
at a philosophical gathering surprisingly often brings 
a positive response from someone for whom reading 
Lavelle is a happy memory. The inaugural lecture 
has been available since it was first given, but the 
addition of the course resumes gives it a new depth 
and should arouse some sympathetic interest. The 
bibliography appended to the volume will make it 
easier to look at Lavelle's world in its full context. 
Leslie ARMOUR 
Université d'Ottawa 
Droits. Revue française de théorie juridique. N"s 
15 et 16: L'État. Paris, PUF, 1992. 
Les deux derniers numéros de la revue Droits sont 
consacrés au difficile concept d'État. Le problème 
est aujourd'hui particulièrement grave puisque l'Etat 
doit en effet faire lace à l'internationalisation de la 
puissance politique et que sa légitimité est parfois 
mise en question. De surcroît, la notion d'Etat de 
droit, si souvent invoquée de nos jours avec plus ou 
moins de pertinence, est loin d'être aussi simple et 
claire (cf. le très bel article de Michel Troper) que 
certains le croient ou feignent de le croire. Aussi est-
il tout à fait appréciable que les auteurs des dix-huit 
contributions rassemblées par les deux volumes de la 
revue aient, selon l'expression suggestive de Denis 
Alland, « "retourné" l'Etat dans tous les sens un peu 
comme on le fait d'un objet qu'on hésite à acquérir 
ou dont on se demande à quoi il peut bien servir». 
En tout cas, les divers articles montrent la silhouette 
polymorphe que prend l'État: selon que l'on s'inter-
roge sur ses origines (Jacques Ellul), qu'on en situe 
le concept dans une perspective historienne (Jean 
Beauté), que l'on scrute l'histoire des idées pour y 
capter à la fois sa manifestation et son essence (Jean-
François Kervegan, Anton Schiitz), que l'on se place 
dans l'optique du droit constitutionnel (Marie-Joëlle 
Redor), du droit civil (Jean Carbonnier) ou pénal 
(Denis Salas) ou encore qu'on le situe dans les pers-
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